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Abstract
We develop a model of monopsonistic wage competition with heterogenous worker ability
and intra-rm production complementarities. We use this to illustrate the conditions under
which: (i) the divergence between wages and productivity is an equilibrium phenomena; and
(ii) this divergence is increasing in worker ability. While the rst result is well-known, the
second is new. It derives from the intra-rm externalities that, it has sometimes been argued,
justify a rms existence. We show how the model can be used to explain a number of empirical
regularities that have hitherto been viewed as puzzles. We then conrm the empirical relevance
of our model using new establishment-level data.
Keywords: Heterogeneous workers, hierarchical assignment models, monopsonistic competition,
wage compression, intra-rm externalities.
JEL Classication: J24, J31, J42.
*We are grateful to the Editor John Kennan and an anonymous referee, and to Ragnar Arnason, V.
Bhaskar, John Dri¢ ll, Friðrik Mar Baldursson, and Helgi Tomasson for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Financial support from ARC Discovery Project Grant No. DP0449887 is gratefully acknowledged.
1
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that rms set wages rising less than one-for-one with observable di¤erences
in workersmarginal products. For example Campbell and Kamlani (1997) conducted a survey
of 184 US rms and found that pay di¤erentials represented about one half of the productivity
di¤erential between any two workers identical in all respects but productivity. Empirical evidence
also shows that rms obtain a greater surplus from their more productive workers. Frank (1984b)
examined wages and productivities of sales workers and university professors, and found that the
more productive workers were paid less than their marginal product, while the least productive were
paid more than their marginal product.
A full explanation of these stylized facts requires clarication as to why rms pay more productive
workers less per unit of their output. This paper puts forward an hypothesis that is consistent with
the stylized facts. Briey, we argue that employers of productive workers have greater market power
viz-a-viz their employees than employers of lower ability workers. Not all employers can provide the
management, colleagues and collective ability that is required for the performance of complex tasks
performed by many skilled workers. But those rms that are able to provide such an environment
are able to extract a greater share of the employment surplus from skilled workers.
Our paper develops a model of wage determination in a frictional labor market with intra-rm
production complementarities. We use this to illustrate the conditions under which: (i) there is a
divergence between wages and productivity; and (ii) this divergence is increasing in worker ability
or skills. While the rst result is well-known, the second is new. It derives from the intra-rm
externalities that, it has sometimes been argued, justify a rms existence. We show how the model
can be used to explain a number of empirical regularities that have hitherto been viewed as puzzles
and then compare our models implications against establishment-level survey data.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief literature review
and highlight some empirical puzzles in the labor literature. In Section 3 we lay out our benchmark
model of monopsonistic competition, in which all workers have the same abilities and are equally
productive when working in di¤erent establishments. Workers di¤er only in their preferences for
rm-specic non-wage attributes, which give rms an element of monopsony power in wage setting.
In Section 4 we expand the model and allow for rm heterogeneity in terms of productivity. This
gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution, and some workers are attracted to the better rms in
spite of their preferences for other rm attributes such as location. In Section 5, we then allow for
di¤erent abilities across workers as well as di¤erences in rm productivity. This generates our main
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results on wage compression within rms, and the answer to some of the empirical questions posed
earlier. Finally, we report results of a survey of companies, where our hypothesis is tested against
some of the alternatives.
2 Reasons for Wage Compression
Opinions di¤er about the benets of equilibrium wage dispersion. On the one hand, a small literature
shows how wage dispersion can raise productivity by providing incentives to workers. On the other
hand, another literature explains why wage dispersion may be detrimental to e¤ort and productivity.
As an example of the former, tournament theory demonstrates how the intra-rml wage distribution
can be used to motivate workers (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Workers are judged on the basis of
relative performance and rewarded with occasional promotions. E¤ort is increasing in the level of
wage dispersion. Calvo and Wellisz (1979) show that, if shirking at the top is more expensive than
at the bottom because when a manager shirks all his subordinates also shirk, the manager needs to
be paid more. In contrast, Lazear (1989) shows why managers can decide to compress intra-rm
wages to create harmony among workers. Salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior and
hence some wage compression within relevant reference groups may be e¢ cient. It follows that wages
should be more compressed in rms with overly competitive employees and also in rms that use
teamwork extensively (see also Pencavel, 1977). A similar argument is put forward by Milgrom and
Roberts (1990). They argue that wage inequalities may give rise to rent-seeking behaviour within
rms when workers change their behaviour with the aim of ensuring wage increases. E¢ ciency wage
models such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) give yet another reason for the optimality of a compressed
wage distribution. They argue that workerse¤ort depends on a comparison of actual wages and
perceived fair wages. When workers are paid less than what they see as being fair, their e¤ort
will su¤er to the detriment of the employer. Other reasons for wage compression can be added.
For example, investment in rm-specic human capital will compress the wage distribution because
workers are not paid the full value of their marginal product. Alternatively, it may be too costly to
measure individual di¤erences in productivity in order to have them reected in wages.
Other authors argue that institutions a¤ect the pay structure. Freeman (1982) shows that
unionized rms appear to have less wage dispersion than non-unionized ones. Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999) catalogue some of the e¤ects of a compressed wage distribution that arises from institutional
factors.1 Hartog and Teulings (1998) describe the role of norms and contracts in a¤ecting the
1By making rms pay the least skilled workers a higher wage than what would have otherwise been agreed on -
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distribution of the surplus generated in employment contracts within the corporatist setting.
In two related papers, Frank (1984a and 1984b) shows how wage compression within rms can
be an equilibrium phenomenon if workers di¤er in their preferences for relative standing or prestige.
Workers who put the highest value on prestige will then be willing to work for a wage that is lower
than their marginal product in return for having lower-level workers around who in return are paid
more than their marginal product. He nds support for his theory in the case of salespeople and
university professors (high-wage individuals are paid less than their marginal product and vice versa
for the low-wage individuals). However, he concludes that the level of wage compression among
professors in his sample is too great to be explained by considerations of status alone and suggests
that production complementarities may provide part of the answer (Frank, 1984, p. 564). This is
what we aim to model in this paper.
Our theory of wage compression di¤ers from those above in that it does not depend on the
existence of institutions nor does it depend on any incentive e¤ects or concern about relative position.
Our view of the rm resembles that of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), who view the rm as a centralized
agent in team production. Firms exist because they facilitate cooperation between workers who can
collectively perform tasks in teams that they could not do individually. Firm management then has
the role of monitoring to prevent shirking, learning about the ability of each individual, matching
them into teams in an optimal way, and measuring their individual contribution to output, i.e.
measuring however imperfectly marginal product.2
We introduce heterogeneity into this framework. We assume that each rm enjoys certain "lo-
cational benets" by o¤ering workers a unique set of non-wage attributes. It is for this reason that
rms can pay workers a wage below marginal product. The di¤erence between marginal product
and wages will then depend on the distance between rms. The greater the distance, the greater are
the locational benets enjoyed by each rm and the higher are prots per employed worker.3 We
will show that the distance between two potential employers of high-productivity workers is likely to
be greater than for the low-productivity ones. In fact, some very skilled individuals may face only a
handful of potential employers. This makes the gap between marginal product and wages increasing
in worker productivity, and thus wages become compressed.
wage compression - institutions may make them invest in new technologies, as well as providing training to the least
skilled, without this a¤ecting the lowest wages. Booth and Zoega (2004) clarify the distinction between "absolute
wage compression" and "relative wage compression".
2Acemoglu (1996) develops a model with social increasing returns to education. Increasing returns in his model
are inter-rm and the externalities are pecuniary, arising from the interaction of costly bilateral search and ex ante
skills investment. While we also nd increasing returns to human capital and ability, our externalities are intra-rm
and are technological rather than pecuniary.
3Thus distance is a metaphor for heterogeneity in nonwage attributes. The more "distant" is one rm from another,
the more di¤erent are its nonwage characteristics, as will be further explained below.
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3 Heterogeneous Preferences
We assume that rms di¤er in the nonpecuniary attributes of the jobs they o¤er, such as geographical
location or other nonwage job characteristics. We also suppose, following Salop (1970), that there
are R rms equally spaced around a circle of circumference C such that the distance between two
adjacent rms in job characteristics space is C=R: Following Bhaskar and To (1999) and Hamilton,
Thisse and Zenou (2000), we assume a simple labor market friction: that workers are characterized
by heterogeneous preferences x for the nonwage job characteristics xj o¤ered by each rm.4 The
more distant are the j-th rms job characteristics xj (j = 1; :::; R) from the workers preferred
characteristics x, the larger is the workers disutility cost (denoted by jx  xj j) associated with
employment at rm j.
Suppose rm j is the representative rm. We follow Salop (1979), Bhaskar and To (1999) and
Hamilton, Thisse and Zenou (2000) in assuming that the variable x is distributed continuously
and uniformly on a circle of length C. Suppose that rmsnonwage job characteristics are equally
spaced around the circumference, such that C=R is the distance between two adjacent rms in job-
characteristics space. The density is given by a constant D and consequently a thick market is
associated with a high value of D while a thin market is associated with a low value. Hence D is
capturing the number of workers of each preference type.
The jth rm has an e¤ective pool of labor whose outer boundary in job-characteristic space is the
threshold between this rms job characteristics xj and the two adjacent rms xj+1and xj 1. Some
workers in these two sub-segments (those closest to the jth rm and further from the thresholds)
are going to be more satised than workers whose preferences are closer to the thresholds between
pairs of rms. Wages are set to satisfy these marginal workers at the thresholds.
The R rms simultaneously choose their wage levels. The net wage a worker receives is thus
wj   jx  xj j, that is the sum of the monetary and non-monetary compensation. To nd the labor
pool for rm j, we rst establish the upper and lower bounds for that rm in job-characteristic
space, represented by x and x respectively. Workers will choose to work at the rm giving them the
highest wage net of their disutility associated with working at that rm. First we consider the lower
bound for the jth rm. Given the wages wj 1 and wj set by the two adjacent rms, the marginal
worker at x will be indi¤erent between working at rm j and rm j   1. Thus we nd x by solving
the following;
4Bhaskar and To (1999) cite various empirical studies supporting the assumption that workers have heterogenous
preferences for nonwage job characteristics. Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) note that this assumption can usefully
summarize the variety of reasons for imperfect competition in the labor market.
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wj   (xj   x) = wj 1   (x  xj 1) (1)
which yields
x =
wj 1   wj + (xj + xj 1)
2
: (2)
Similarly, the upper bound for the jth rm x solves:
wj+1   (xj+1   x) = wj   (x  xj) (3)
which yields
x =
wj   wj+1 + (xj+1 + xj)
2
: (4)
Firm j sets wages by maximizing prots Pj , written as:
Pj =
xZ
x
D (y   wj) dx = D (y   wj) (x  x) (5)
where wages at the jth rm are denoted by wj and y is output per worker. This brings us to our
rst proposition:
Proposition 1 The smaller is the number of rms R, the larger is the gap between wages and
productivity.
Proof:
The rst-order condition of (5) yields the following equation:5
D (y   wj) = D (x  x) (6)
The term on the left-side shows the marginal benet of raising wages due to a larger workforce. The
term on the right-hand side gives the marginal cost of raising wages, which consists of higher wage
payments to all workers. Using equations (2) and (4), and after some manipulation, we obtain the
following:
5The second order condition holds, d
dwj

dj
dwj

< 0:
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(y   wj) = [(xj+1   xj 1)  (wj+1 + wj 1) + 2wj ]
2
(7)
We know that rms are located symmetrically around the circle of nonwage job-characteristic space,
such that the distance between rms is given by C=R. Consequently xj+1   xj 1 = 2C=R. In
symmetric equilibrium with wj = wj+1 = wj 1 we can now simplify the equation above to obtain:
wj = y  
C
R
(8)
Notice in (8) that as R ! 1, wj ! y. This is the wage scenario for a perfectly competitive labor
market. However, as R! 1, wj ! y   C.6 
The intuition behind this result, analogous to that of Bhaskar and To (1999), is as follows:
When there is a lot of heterogeneity in nonwage job characteristics for a given number of rms (C
is large), each rm is faced with many workers who prefer its nonwage job characteristics to those
of other rms. This makes the cost of raising wages high because by o¤ering higher wages aimed
at attracting new recruits whose preferences do not match the jobs being o¤ered as well rms will
have to pay higher wages to many workers who would have stayed with them anyway. However, if
there are very many rms (R is large), then not many workers would settle for any given rm in the
absence of wage incentives. This reduces the marginal cost of o¤ering higher wages. It follows that,
as the number of rms R increases, the marginal cost of raising wages falls, which makes the wage
level rise towards marginal productivity as the number of rms approaches innity.
Notice that labor supply n to rm j is given by
n = D (x  x) = D

wj   1
2
(wj+1 + wj 1) +
C
R

(9)
and is increasing in the rms own wage, in contrast to the perfectly competitive case where the
labor supply is innitely elastic.7 Moreover, the labor supply is a positive function of the density
D and the heterogeneity of workerspreferences C and a negative function of the number of rms
competing for the workers R. The more workers there are of each preference type D, and the more
heterogeneous are workers in their preferences, the greater the number of workers who want to join
a particular rm. However, taking the density and the heterogeneity as given, a greater number of
rms implies that fewer workers will apply to any single rm. In symmetric equilibrium we have
6To ensure wj > 0, we impose the restriction that y > C.
7There is a small empirical literature estimating the elasticity of the labor demand curve faced by individual rms.
These support our models prediction that employers each face an upward sloping labor supply curve (see Barth and
Dale-Olsen, 1999; Manning, 2003: Chapter 4).
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n = D (x  x) = DC
R
(10)
Labor supply now only depends on the thickness of the market D, the heterogeneity of preferences
C, and the number of rms R in this case. We next relax the symmetric equilibrium assumption
and explore the consequences of greater rm heterogeneity.
4 Good Firms and Bad Firms
We next assume that some rms are better than others for all workers independent of job attributes
in that the productivity of a worker with given innate abilities h depends on the cooperation of
colleagues and the quality of the management team.8 Workers cooperate more e¤ectively in some
rms because they make better teams, face superior incentive structures or are better managed.
We let the continuous variable Fj denote the intra-rm productive externalities within rm j and
assume that for the set of R rm the variable Fj has a distribution g (Fj). The production function
that shows the productivity of a given worker within rm j is the following:
yj = hF
a
j (11)
where h is the same for all workers. The equation implies, for a given level of F; constant returns
to individual ability. The importance of the intra-rm spillovers is captured by the parameter a.
The higher is a; the more important is the quality of the cooperation between workers as opposed
to individual abilities. And in the special case of a = 0; output depends only on individual abilities.
Each of the R rms sets wages as before to maximize prots:
Pj =
xZ
x
D

hF aj   wjh

dx = Dh

F aj   wj

(x  x) (12)
where wj now denotes the wage per unit of human capital so that wages per worker wj are dened
as wj = wjh:
The rst-order-conditions of prot maximization follow for a given level of rm productivity Fj :
Dh

F aj   wj

= Dh (x  x) (13)
8We know of only two studies estimating intra-rm externalities, and both of these focus on returns to education.
Battu, Beleld and Sloane (2003) use linked employer-employee British data to show that that are indeed intra-rm
social returns to education that exceed individual returns. And Beleld, Battu and Sloane (2004) nd a similar result
for service workers.
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The left-hand side shows the marginal benet of raising wages as before and the right-hand side the
marginal cost. Rearranging gives,
wj = F
a
j +
1
2
[(wj+1 + wj 1)  2wj ]  C
R
(14)
Wages at rm j are inuenced by three factors. The rst is the level of within-rm productivity
Fj , the second factor is wages at neighboring rms, wj+1and wj 1, and the third is the distance
between rms C=R. Wages are increasing in the rms productivity and in wages at other rms and
decreasing in the distance between rms. It follows that wages are also dependent on wages at all
other rms since wj+2 inuences wj+1 and wj 2 inuences wj 1 and so forth.9
This extension of the model with rm heterogeneity is consistent with several observations about
labor markets. First, as shown by Krueger and Summers (1988), there are signicant wage di¤erences
across rms and industries. Second, workers who move between industries experience wage changes
comparable to the wage di¤erentials that exist between industries (see also Gibbons and Katz,
1992). Krueger and Summers (1988) argue that these observations are compatible with e¢ ciency
wage models and not with a competitive model of the labor market. Our model - in which rms
have an element of market or monopsony power because of workersheterogeneous preferences and
di¤erences in productivities - is also consistent with these observations. But it is not an e¢ ciency
wage model. There is also the observation that high-wage industries have higher average levels of
human capital, higher prots and more capital per worker. In the following section we explicitly
incorporate the average level of human capital into our analysis.
5 Di¤erent Abilities and Wage Compression
We now turn to the "black box" F aj that measures the j-th rms productivity. We assume that
a > 0; that is, rm productivity matters for individual output. We explain di¤erences in rm
productivity by postulating intra-rm production externalities, whereby each worker benets from
having good management and compatible high-ability colleagues. Thus rms exist because they
facilitate cooperation between workers, who collectively perform tasks in teams that they could
not do individually. In this we follow Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Acemoglu (1996), amongst
others.10
9 In the special case when output of a worker depends only on his abilities and is not dependent on the environment,
that is a = 0, equation (14) becomes: wj = 1  CR :
10Although Acemoglu (1996) models inter-rm pecuniary externalities, he argues that the purely technological view
of how human capital externalities a¤ect the economy should take into account intra -rm rather than inter-rm
externalities. Thus the "problem for the purely technological view is that, excluding education and R&D, major
9
We make this assumption explicit by supposing that these factors determine the number of
tasks K  from the simplest to the most complicated  that can be performed at the j-th rm.
In particular, we propose that the rms ability to perform di¤erent tasks depends on the average
ability level Hj doing all tasks within that rm. Thus we assume that production externalities,
morale, the quality of teamwork, and the quality of management are all related to this variable.
This can be expressed as:
K
 
Hj

; K 0
 
Hj

> 0: (15)
Due to the Central Limit Theorem, the economy-wide distribution of average ability Hj at each
rm has a normal distribution ; 2 independently of the distribution of individual abilities. The
expected number of rms that can perform k
 
Hj

tasks is then given by
66664
0B@1  HjZ
 1
;2
 
Hj

dH
1CAR
77775 = RK(Hj) (16)
where bc denotes the oor function dened as the function that gives the largest integer less than
or equal to its element of one minus the cumulative distribution function. Using this function is
necessary to prevent the number of rms taking a non-integer value.11 It follows that RK is declining
in K
 
Hj

since the right tail of the distribution is decreasing in Hj .
5.1 Technology
The production function for the j-th rm takes the following form:
Yj = A
K(Hj)Q
k=1
Hkk ; m > n for m > n (17)
where Hk is total human capital devoted to task k (summed over all workers doing the task) and
A is a measure of overall productivity. Average ability determines the number of tasks that can be
performed, as described above. The more advanced tasks have a higher elasticity of output with
respect to ability devoted to the task as measured by the exponents m.12 Moreover, the elasticity
human capital interactions happen among employees within a rm: for example, young workers learn from their more
experienced colleagues. But these interactions should be internalized within the rm, and no economywide human
capital externalities should be observed." This intra-rm interaction is precisely what we are modeling in our analysis.
11To take an example, when 15% of rms have average ability that is higher than that of rm Hj ( Hj) and R=10,
the oor function gives b0:15  10c = 1.
12That the alphas are rising in task complexity means that people doing these tasks are more productive than the
ones doing the simple tasks. (An x% increase in h of a worker doing the advanced task does more to increase output
than an x% increase in h of a worker doing a simple task which seems a reasonable assumption.)
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of the technical rate of substitution13 implies that a given percentage fall in inputs going into an
advanced task m has to be met by a larger percentage increase in the inputs into a less advanced
task n in order to keep output Yj unchanged. It is in this sense that the more advanced tasks are
more productive for the rm.
As an illustration, suppose that the j-th rm performs two tasks; K
 
Hj

= 2. We then obtain:
Yj = AH
1
1 H
2
2 (18)
This can be written, for the special case H1 = H2, as Yj = AH1+2 : This equals HA in the special
case 1 + 2 = 1, which is the production function (11) of the previous section with F = A and
a = 1. We can also write an equation for output coming from one task as:
yj = H
k
 A
K(Hj)Q
k 6=
Hkk (19)
which is identical to equation (11) if  = 1. Here A
K(Hj)Q
k 6=
Hkk = F
a
j so that the productivity of
workers doing task  is increasing in the total number of tasks being performed within the rm, i.e.
increasing in the average ability of the workforce.
5.2 Wage Setting
Firms set wages for each task in order to maximize prots. Marginal productivity of a unit of human
capital doing task  is,
y (H; ) = AH 1
Y
k 6=
Hkk   wj (20)
Prots from doing task  are dened as,
Pj =
xZ
x
Dh [y   wj] dx = Dh [y   wj] (x  x) (21)
where h denotes the average level of human capital per worker doing the task and wj denotes
wages per unit of human capital doing this task as in previous section. The rst-order-conditions of
13From equation (17) it follows that:
dY
dHm
dY
dHn
= n
m
< 1
The technical elasticity of substitution between Hn and Hm is less than one, i.e. it takes a larger percentage increase
in inputs into a simple task to make up for a given percentage fall in inputs into an advanced task.
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prot maximization follow:
Dh [y   wj] = Dh (x  x) (22)
The left-hand side shows the marginal benet of raising the wage in the form of the value of new
recruits while the right-hand side has the marginal costs taking the form of higher wage payments
to those who would have stayed anyway. This gives the following expression for the wage paid per
unit of human capital allocated to task :
wj = yj +
1
2
[(wj+1; + wj 1;)  2wjk]  C
R
(23)
We can then write:
yj   wj = C
R
  1
2
[(wj+1; + wj 1;)  2wjk] (24)
Since R is decreasing in  we nd that y   w is increasing in . This is our second proposition:
Proposition 2 The di¤erence between productivity and wages is increasing in task complexity.
For the K = 2 and H1 = H2 case, the equation becomes the following for the more advanced
task:
wj2 = 2A  1
2
[(wj+1;2 + wj 1;2)  2wj2]  C
R2
(25)
when 1 + 2 = 1, which is analogous to equation (14) above in the case a = 1.
Notice that wages are increasing in the number of tasks because of the Cobb-Douglas setup. By
adding new tasks we get workers who lift the productivity of everyone, and we capture in a plausible
way the intra-rm production externalities noted by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Acemoglu
(1996) inter alia. That the alphas are rising in task complexity means that people doing these tasks
are more productive than the ones doing the simple tasks.14
5.3 Task Assignment and Induction Training
Having established optimal wages for each task, we now turn to the optimal allocation of workers of
di¤erent abilities across tasks, for a given optimally chosen wages. We make two assumptions to do
14Notice also that worker "scarcity" leads to higher wages ceteris paribus. If there are few workers of a given skill
level compared to the number of rms, the value of C/R is low, which translates into high wages. This can be seen
from equations (8) and (25).
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with induction training for each worker. First, each worker is trained to do one task only. Second,
training costs are increasing in task complexity. The j-th rm will only hire a worker as long as it
prots from doing so and there may be workers of such low abilities that it is not in the interest of
any rm to hire them. The following condition will hold for every worker trained to do task k:
(yk   wjk)hi  ck (26)
where yk is as dened above. The term on the left-hand side is the expected prots from employing
worker i. Only if this condition holds does the rm allocate and train a worker for task k. Since
the number of workers applying for jobs at the representative rm is given by supply and the rm
is willing to hire any worker as long as inequality (25) holds for at least one of the tasks we are
primarily interested in the allocation of workers across tasks. We will show that the best workers
should be allocated to the most advanced tasks within the rm.
Assume that there is a worker with ability level hj doing task r the most sophisticated within
rm r and another doing the least advanced task task 1 with a higher ability level hi; hi > hj .
If the rm could, ex-post, relocate them at zero cost that is recant its earlier decision and assign
workers di¤erently to the tasks so that the latter would be trained to do task r and the former to
do task 1, the expected benet to the rm would be the following since total training costs would
be unchanged:
[(yr   wr)  (y1   w1)] (hi   hj) > 0 (27)
which is positive if and only if
(yr   wr)  (y1   w1) > 0 (28)
that is if the rm benets more from the employment of a worker doing the sophisticated task. We
have shown this to be the case because of a greater degree of monopsony power for task r. It will
then become clear that the best workers would be allocated to the most advanced task and the worst
to the least advanced one.
Let us now take a look at the rm rank K which performs all tasks of complexity K and below.
The most exceptional workers will then be devoted to task K. It follows from equation (25) that
the threshold ability level is:
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hi  cK
yK   wK (29)
Because of the high degree of monopsony for task K, the rm benets from allocating all of its
workers to the task but this comes at a cost; the cost of training a worker to do task K is higher
than the cost of training him to do any other task. Workers who do not meet the grade for task K
may then be allocated to task K   1 as long as the following condition holds:
cK 1
yK 1   wK 1  hi <
cK
yK   wK (30)
The inequality to the right says that worker i is not good enough for the most advanced task while the
inequality on the left says that he is good enough for task K   1. Note that while the monopsony
prot form task K is greater than that for task K   1, the cost of training the worker is lower.
Importantly, a worker who is judged not to be su¢ ciently able for task K will only be trained to do
task K   1 if lower training costs o¤set the e¤ect of lower monopsony power. Finally, there will be
some workers who are not even su¢ ciently good for task 1:
hi <
c1
y1   w1 (31)
These workers will not be trained for any task within this rm in spite of the low costs of training
a worker to do the most basic task and will be turned away. This yields our third proposition:
Proposition 3 The highest ability workers should be allocated to the most advanced task and the
worst to the least advanced one.
In the sequential production-task models of Kremer (1992) and Sobel (1992), mistakes made
doing the early tasks can be easily corrected without destroying the output of any subsequent
worker. However, mistakes made performing the nishing touches can ruin the work performed
doing all earlier tasks. Hence they show that a rm should put the more skilled and reliable workers
in charge of the nal tasks. While our model is also directed at task complexity, it is in a di¤erent
context, since our production process is not sequential. Almost any employee can make serious
mistakes in our model. Nonetheless, we still nd that the more able workers should be delegated to
the more advanced tasks, because the rm then reaps maximum prots from the greater monopsony
position associated with the more di¢ cult tasks, as we show below. It is more protable to be in a
monopsony position vis-a-vis the more productive workers.
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It follows that the more advanced is the relevant task, the higher are prots from performing
the task within the rm: all rms can perform the simplest task, hence the level of competition is
highest for this task. But as rms become better, they gain elements of monopsony power in the
market for labor trained to do tasks that are only feasible within their ranks labor that can only
produce output in the company of the high-quality workers currently employed.
5.4 Wage Compression
According to Proposition 3 the better workers should always be assigned to the more advanced task.
Since these workers have higher ability they embody more units of innate human capital they
also have higher take-home wages wkhi on that count. But Proposition 2 tells us that monopsony
prots increase as we move to more advanced tasks. It is easy to combine Propositions 2 and 3 to
show that the wage distribution is compressed in our model. This yields Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Wage compression arises quite naturally in a model with heterogeneous workers: As
we move from a less advanced to a more advanced task, the increase in output per worker is greater
than the increase in take-home wages, i.e. there is wage compression. For a worker hi doing task k
and a lower ability worker hj doing task k   1, it follows that:
hiyk   hjyk 1 > hiwk   hjwk 1 (32)
Proof:
This proposition is easily veried using our earlier equations. We know that
hi (yk   wk) > hj (yk 1   wk 1)
since according to Proposition 2
yk   wk > yk 1   wk 1 (33)
and hi > hj . This can then be rewritten as
hiyk   hjyk 1 > hiwk   hjwk 1 (34)
which is our denition of wage compression.
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The results in Proposition 4 shows that wage compression arises quite naturally in a world of
heterogeneous workers in the absence of any specic institutional arrangements.15 Note that the
compressed wage distribution arises through monopsonistic competition (as in the benchmark model
of Section 3) augmented by the presence of intrarm production externalities arising from di¤erences
in workersabilities. The latter are interpreted as the externalities associated with team production.
Our model is consistent with the results of Teulings and Hartog (1998). They nd, for a cross-
section of industries in the United States and Canada, a positive correlation between wages and
average observed human capital in the industry. They also nd a positive correlation between wages
and prots per worker. In addition to being consistent with these ndings, our model explains the
presence of wage di¤erences across industries found by Krueger and Summers (1988) and Gibbons
and Katz (1992). No other single model that relies on the incentive e¤ects of the within-rm wage
distribution, or on the role of institutions in compressing the wage distribution, accounts for all
these observations.
5.5 Welfare
The question remains as to whether or not the allocation of labor across rms is optimal in equilib-
rium. Clearly, the employers monopsony power creates a distortion in the allocation of labor across
rms. Consider two rms that are adjacent on the attribute circle, j and j + 1, one with a most
advanced task being performed  and the other performing no task ranked higher than   1. The
rst is better in that more tasks can be performed within its ranks due to a higher average level
of ability among its workers. The bound between the two rms in the job-characteristics space is
dened by the equation below;
wj;   (x  xj) = wj+1; 1   (xj+1   x) (35)
which yields
x =
wj;   wj+1; 1 + (xj+1 + xj)
2
: (36)
Labor supply n to task  at rm j is given by
15Our equations do not preclude wages from falling as we move from a less advanced to a more advanced task.
However, such an eventuality can be exluded by assuming that output is su¢ ciently rising in task complexity to
prevent rising monopsony power from lowering wages.
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np = D (x  x) = D

wj;   1
2
(wj+1; 1 + wj 1) +
C
R

(37)
where D denotes the density of workers qualied to do both tasks  and    1; and where the
superscript denotes "private" to distinguish the private rms labor supply from the socially optimal
labor supply denoted as ns below.
The optimal bound between the two rms and the optimal supply of labor are, in contrast, given
by the following two equations:
x =
yj;   yj+1; 1 + (xj+1 + xj)
2
: (38)
ns = D (x  x) = D

yj;   1
2
(yj+1; 1 + yj 1) +
C
R

(39)
where y denotes marginal product as in equation (19). According to to Proposition 2 we have
y   w > y 1   w 1 since R < R 1; wages are compressed. If we assume that rm j   1 is
also only doing   1 tasks we nd that
ns   np = D

(yj;   wj;)  1
2
(yj+1; 1   wj+1; 1)  1
2
(yj 1; 1   wj 1; 1)

(40)
which can be written as
ns   np = D [(y   w)  (y 1   w 1)] > 0 (41)
This implies that the good rm, which can perform all  tasks, does not attract a su¢ cient number
of workers. This is because there are workers who decide to stay closer to their preferred place
on the job-attributes circle, and who settle for a less challenging task and lower wages due to the
monopsony power of the best rm.
6 Firm Entry
Our model shows the possibility of monopsonistic wage-setting with a particular distribution of rms
and with rm and worker heterogeneity, but it does not endogenize the existing distribution of rms.
We simply assume that rms are heterogenous in their nonwage characteristics and then we show
that rms who get a good draw of workers are more protable.
17
The number of rms could be endogenized by allowing for entry at a cost. Expected prots from
setting up a new rm equal the sum of prots from the expected number of taks performed, which
is a function of the expected value of average human capital. From equation (21) we nd that
E (Pj) =
K(E(Hj))X
k=1
Pjk =
K(E(Hj))X
k=1
Dkhk [yk   wk] (xk   xk) (42)
where Dk denotes the density of workers eligible for doing task k and hk is the average human
capital doing task k. Using equations (21)-(23) we nd that in symmetric equilibrium this equals
E (Pj) =
K(E(Hj))X
k=1
Dkhk

C
Rk
2
(43)
It is clear that expected prots are declining in the number of rms doing each task Rk for two
reasons: First, the greater the number of rms, the higher is the wage per unit of human capital.
Second, the greater the number of rms, the fewer workers would be willing to work for the entrant
rm. Assuming a xed cost  of setting up a new rm gives a zero-net-expected-prots condition
for the entry of new rms:
K(E(Hj))X
k=1
Dkhk

C
Rk
2
   = 0 (44)
While this equation determines the number of rms in the market, R = R1, it does not determine
the number of rms performing each task. Clearly, ex-post some rms will have better human capital
Hj and hence perform more tasks and earn prots in excess of starting costs  while others will be
less fortunate. However, in equilibrium expected prots from entry should equal the cost, as in the
above equation.
Suppose  for the sake of argument  that there is only one rm in operation. In this case
E (Pj) >  because of low wages and because of opportunities for o¤ering a di¤erent set of non-
pecuniary benets to workers. Also, there is no benet from such a concentration as the number of
tasks performed depends on average human capital, not total human capital, by assumption. Hence
new rms enter until the expected prots from doing so is just equal to the cost .
Note that the equation above is likely to lead to an overestimate of the number of rms in the
market, because of the following arguments about worker behaviour that are not captured in the
equations above. Suppose a new rm considers entering the market, attracted by the monopsonistic
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prots being earned, E (Pj) > . Suppose this new rm were to set up next door in non-wage job
characteristic space to the very best existing rm, and then to ask existing employees to move next
door. Clearly, half the workers employed at the good rm would prefer working for the new rm if all
tasks could also be performed there, since its characteristics will be closer to their preferences. But
on the other hand, the fracturing of the workforce would also a¤ect the pay of all workers through
changes to the intra-rm externalities. Indeed, there is, for existing workers, uncertainty associated
with such a move. First, the quality of management in the new rm is unknown. Second, the quality
of that half of the existing rms workers who would be willing to shift is also unknown, and may
turn out to be worse than that already in existence.16 Thus it is clear that endogenizing rm entry
introduces into our model an extra layer of complexity. While we think this could be handled in a
dynamic framework with at least two periods, it would introduce further complexity into a model
that is already quite intricate and we leave this for future work.
7 Empirical Relevance
A prediction of our model is that rms gain more from employing able workers because of the
proportionately larger oligopsony rents they collect. To see if there is any empirical evidence for
this, we commissioned a survey of managers.17
The respondents, representing establishments with four or more employees, were asked two ques-
tions that are of direct relevance to our theory. The rst question asked if more able workers are
worth more to the rm and, if the respondent answered in the a¢ rmative, the second asked why
this might be the case. These questions are reproduced in full below.
 Question 1: "Do the more able employees generate (a) more prots; (b) the same level of
prots; (c) lower prots; than other employees?"
 Question 2: "If you chose response (a) in your answer to question 1 above, do the more able
employees get paid less relative to their productivity because (a) otherwise morale among the
lower paid workers would be hurt; (b) because there are not many other establishments where
16Note that the uncertainty involved is smaller for low ability workers since they depend less on the average ability
level within the rm.
17The representative survey was conducted by Gallup, Iceland. The initial sampling frame yielded 900 rms
(independent, not branches of larger companies), of whom 147 were dropped as they employed fewer than 4 employees
and 35 were either bankrupt or had stopped operating. This left a sample of 718 rms. These 718 rms were then
contacted, of whom 236 refused to answer and 81 could not be reached. The survey thus yielded 401 usable responses.
This represents a response rate of 56%. All of the rms are located in Iceland although some have operations abroad.
Respondents were managing directors of the di¤erent rms. For a more detailed analysis, see Karlsson and Zoega
(2005).
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the better employees can use their talent to the same extent as with the current employee; (c)
because other potential employers do not realize how good the better employees are; (d) for
other reasons."
Table 1 reports the results of this survey. The rst row gives the responses for all rms, and
subsequent rows give responses disaggregated by measures of rm size and industrial grouping.
Responses to Question 1 reveal that the majority of respondents say that able workers contribute
more to prots, that is, they are paid less compared to their productivity than the less able workers.
Question 2 asks those who stated that more able workers generate more prots about the reasons
for this phenomenon. From the rst row, we see that 57% (203) of rms responded that more
able employees generate more prots than less able employees, while 40% (141 rms) believed they
generated the same level of prots. Moving along the rst row, note that 38% of rms who pay more
able employees less relative to their productivity attribute this to a need to maintain morale among
the less well paid - response (a). Some 14% attribute it instead to a lack of outside options, dened
here as being where "there are not many other establishments where the better employees can use
their talent to the same extent as with the current employee" - response (b).18 Finally, 9.7% of
managers claim that it is due to asymmetric information about worker ability that they can pay
the able workers less than their marginal productivity; i.e. other rms do not poach them because
they do not realize their true value - response (c). Thus there is support from response (b) for our
models predictions - that monopsonistic competition leads to wage compression - but on average
the morale e¤ect in response (a) dominates. Next we see what happens when we disaggregate the
results further.
Panel A - giving the results broken down by turnover per annum - shows that rms with higher
turnover were more likely than lower turnover rms to believe that more able employees generate
more prots than less able employees. Thus Panel A suggests that prots from better workers are
higher in rms with greater turnover, which we view as a proxy for task complexity. Moreover,
higher turnover rms were also more likely than lower turnover rms to attribute this protability
from more able workers to a lack of outside options (19% of high turnover as compared to 9% low
turnover rms).
18Not all rms responsed to Question 2, even where routed that way, and hence the numbers of rms responding
to this question is less than the number of rms responding to Question 1(a).
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Table 1. Survey results
Question 1 Question 2
responses options responses options
a b c a b c d
All rms 357 56.9 39.5 3.6 154 38.3 13.6 9.7 38.3
A. Turnover (Million kronur19)
0-49 30 43 50 7 11 18 9 27 45
50-99 58 62 38 0 29 41 14 0 45
100-199 67 54 40 6 28 39 7 11 43
200-499 77 60 35 5 34 53 12 9 26
>500 86 62 37 1 43 28 19 12 42
B. All Employees
4-6 87 45 49 6 28 25 7 11 57
7-10 67 58 39 3 31 52 3 10 35
11-25 89 55 42 3 33 36 21 9 33
>25 114 67 31 3 62 39 18 10 34
C. Industry
service 139 58 38 4 57 32 9 18 42
manufacturing 105 58 37 5 48 48 21 6 25
wholesale/retail 77 49 48 3 27 26 4 7 63
other 36 67 33 0 22 50 23 0 27
Panel B gives the results broken down by the number of employees. Larger rms were more
likely to respond that more able employees generate more prots than less able employees (67% of
rms with more than 25 employees as compared to 45% of rms with 4-6 employees). Thus prots
from the better workers are higher in the larger rms. Firm size might be viewed as a proxy for task
complexity and teamwork possibilities. Moreover, larger rms were also more likely than smaller
rms to attribute this to a lack of outside options (18% of larger as compared to 7% of smaller
rms).
Finally, Panel C gives the responses disaggregated by sector. It is clear that the wholesale and
retail sector does not t our model, a perhaps unsurprising result given that task complexity and
19On 17 May 2005, there were 65 Icelandic kronur to one US dollar.
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teamwork are likely to be less important in this sector. However, in the other three industrial
groupings, the majority of rms responded that more able employees generate more prots than less
able employees. It is also striking that in both manufacturing and in the "other" industrial grouping
that one fth of rms attribute their opinion (that more able employees generate more prots than
less able employees) to a lack of outside options. Notice that the moral hazard reason - that other
rms do not poach employees because they do not realize their true value - appears to be a service
sector phenomenon.
We also explored the data further by looking are responses to Question 2 for manufacturing
rms only. The results indicate that our proposed explanation for wage compression response (b)
receives more support among larger manufacturing rms. In fact, response (b) receives the same
support as response (a) for rms with turnover in excess of 500 Million kronur and for rms with
11-25 employees.
In summary, our survey results indicate rst, that the majority of managers believe that able
workers contribute more to prots than less able workers; that is, they are paid less compared to their
productivity than the less able workers. Second, the survey results suggest that the outside option
explanation for wage compression is important in some sectors of the economy. In particular, it is
more important in establishments with high nancial turnover, in rms with at least 11 employees,
and in manufacturing. While not a conclusive test of the models predictions, these results certainly
suggest that our theory has empirical relevance for at least some sectors of the economy.
8 Conclusions
We have shown how wage compression arises quite naturally in market economies with monopsonistic
competition in the labor market and with heterogeneous workers and rms. This result follows from
several intermediate results of our analysis:
 The number of tasks that can be performed within a rm depends on the average level of ability
of workers within the rm. It follows that there are good rms where the most advanced tasks
can be performed, as well as bad rms where only the more simple tasks can be done.
 The degree of rmsmarket or monopsony power is rising in task complexity.
 Firms allocate the best workers to the most sophisticated tasks. While more talented workers
get paid more on the basis of their higher ability, they do not receive the full return to their
talent owing to the monopsony power enjoyed by their employers.
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We have argued that each of these results is plausible as well as expected. Moreover, combining
the three to generate microeconomic foundations for wage compression may turn out to be a useful
result in understanding some puzzles in labor economics.
9 Appendix
The raw numbers from the survey are shown in the two tables below.
Table A1. Question 1
Responses number % st. d.
more 203 56.9 5.1
equal 141 39.5 5.1
less 13 3.6 1.9
total 357 100
responses 357 89
no-responses 44 11
Number surveyed 401 100
Table A2. Question 2
Responses number % st. d.
a 59 38.2 7.7
b 21 13.6 5.4
c 15 9.7 4.7
d 59 38.3 7.7
total 154 100
responses 154 75.9
no-responses 49 24.1
Number surveyed 203 100
Number surveyed 203 50.6
Not surveyed 198 49.4
Total 401 100
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